Moral and Political Philosophy

  1. Against the Autonomy Argument for Mandatory GMO Labelling
    • Public Affairs Quarterly (forthcoming)
  2. Climate-related insecurity, loss and damage
    • Ethics, Policy & Envrionment (2017), 20(2): 184-194
  3. Health Security and Risk Aversion
    • Bioethics (2016), 30(7): 479-489
  4. The Concept of Security, Liberty, Fear and the State
    • Security: Dialogue across disciplines, (2015) edited by P. Bourbeau. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge): 22-44 (PDF)
  5. Obesity, Liberty, and Public Health Emergencies
  6. Live liver donation, ethics and practitioners
    • Journal of Medical Ethics (2014), 40(3): 157-162 (w/ E. Thomas, S. Bramhall & H. Draper) (PDF)
  7. The Concept of Security
    • Ethics and Security Aspects of Infectious Disease Control: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (2012), ed. M.J. Selgelid & C. Enemark. (Ashgate: Burlington): 7-26 (PDF)
    • Reprinted in Security Ethics (2015), ed. K. Hadjimatheou, J. Guelke & T. Sorell. (Ashgate: Burlington) (Link)

Health Politics and Policy

  1. The limits of global health diplomacy: Taiwan’s observer status at the world health assembly
    • Globalization and Health (2014), 10: 71-80 (w/ K. Lee) (PDF)
  2. The Securitisation of Infectious Disease: International Norms and Domestic Politics in Asia
    • Review of International Studies (2011), 37(1): 141-166 (w/ M. Curley) (PDF)
    • Reprinted in Health Security and Governance (2012), ed. N. Thomas. (Routledge: London). (Link)
  3. Securitization of infectious diseases in Vietnam: the cases of HIV and avian influenza
    • Health Policy and Planning (2010), 25(6): 467-475 (PDF)

Book Reviews/Commentaries

Working Papers

Please do not cite without permission

  • Secure Plans
    • Abstract: In this paper I argue that the security of basic goods enables agents like us to engage in rational deliberation. I define the security of a good as the probability of realizing that good regardless of which act an agent performs within their set of alternatives. If a good is sufficiently secure then we are practically justified in treating that good as a background condition in our deliberation. This is useful, in so far as it allows us to treat that good as independent of our present deliberation, but it is especially useful if that good is a necessary means to some future course of action. Possessing the practical justification for treating some goods and future actions as independent of our current actions enables agents like us to engage in approximately rational instrumental reasoning.
  • Security and Wellbeing
    • Abstract: What is the relationship between the security of personal goods and individual wellbeing? The standard answer is that security of personal goods is relevant to wellbeing only in so far as grave risks may cause fear and anxiety. We might, however, be tempted by the idea that security directly contributes to individual wellbeing, independent of whether individuals are aware of the risks they face. I investigate four potential ways in which security might directly contribute to individual wellbeing: (i) it satisfies a preference, (ii) it is neccessary to be a "planning agent", (iii) it is constitutive of an individual’s capabilities, and (iv) it is a modally-robust good. Ultimately, I argue that giving in to this temptation would be a mistake, and that the connection between security and wellbeing is wholly mediated by an individual’s beliefs.
  • Value Theory and Conceptions of Security
    • Abstract: It has long been recognised that conceptions of security are informed by underlying political philosophies. It is not often recognised, however, that the way in which many of these conceptions are articulated and justified can be seen as extensions of particular attitudes towards value. In this paper I identify the linkages between a particular way of thinking about security – securitization theory – and a deontological approach to value. I argue that not only does a focus on security practices marginalise the idea of security as a state of being, it presupposes a deontological approach to value which makes it difficult to justify security practices in circumstances where the security of moral agents is gravely threatened. I give two reasons for securitization theory, and critical security studies more generally, to return to a consideration of security as a state of being: first, that an explanatorily adequate account of security speech and practice must engage with concepts of being secure, and second, that a strict focus on deontological value undermines the ecumenical character of critical security studies. Scholars of critical security studies should neglect neither the idea of being secure nor teleological approaches to value if the critical potential of investigating security practices is to be fully realised.